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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) 
has had trade creation or trade diversion effects on the rest of the World. The method 
used resembles the one used by Romalis (2005) to study NAFTA. In order to use the 
variations in tariff at the product level, we use six digit HS classification of products. 
We construct seven panel data sets for the period 1996 to 2006. We use the commodity 
and time variation in the tariff preferences allowed under ISLFTA, to identify its effect 
on sourcing of different products from ‗control country‘ to ISLFTA region. Using fixed 
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1  Introduction 
The  growth  of  regional  trade  blocs  has  been  one  of  the  major  developments  in 
international relations in recent years. During the 1990s, regionalism was conceived as a 
developmental  option  in  itself  that  would  promote  competitiveness  of  trade  bloc 
members  and  help  their  fast  integration  into  the  international  economy.  As  per  the 
World Bank report on ‗Global Economic Prospects‘ (2005) the number of the Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs) has more than quadrupled since 1990 rising to around 230 
by late 2004 and the trade between RTA partners now constitutes nearly 40% of total 
global trade. Quoting, World Trade Organisation (WTO) this report estimates another 
60 agreements at various stages of negotiations. The World Bank report points out that 
the boom in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) reflects changes in certain countries‘ 
trade  policy  objectives,  the  changing  perceptions  of  the  multilateral  liberalization 
process, and the reintegration into the global economy of countries in transition from 
socialism.  
Regional agreements vary widely, but all have the objective of reducing barriers to trade 
between  member  countries—which  implies  discrimination  against  trade  with  other 
countries. At their simplest, these agreements merely remove tariffs on intra bloc trade 
in  goods,  but  many  go  beyond  that  to  cover  non-tariff  barriers  and  to  extend 
liberalization to investment and other policies. At their deepest, they have the goal of 
economic  union  and  involve  the  construction  of  shared  executive,  judicial,  and 
legislative institutions. Many factors, some explicitly stated and others not so publicly 
admitted, have been responsible for the recent spurt in regionalism. The desire to put the 
multilateral  system  into faster and deeper action in  selected areas  by  creating more 
powerful blocs that would operate within the GATT/WTO system
2 and the fear of being 
left out while the rest of the world swept into regionalism, the domino effect are often 
cited as the major reason for the growth of RTAs. After China‘s entry into WTO , the 
                                                 
2 Article XXIV of the GATT, 1994 imposes three basic obligations on WTO members wishing to enter 
into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) covering trade in goods--- i) An obligation to notify the FTA to the 
WTO; ii) An obligation not to raise the overall level of protection and make access of products of third 
parties not participating  in the FTA more onerous (the so-called external trade requirement); and iii) An 
obligation to liberalize substantially all the trade among constituents of the FTA (the so-called internal 
trade requirement).    4 
East Asia has experienced a massive domino effect with dozens of new RTAs being 
announced,  negotiated  and  signed  (Baldwin  2006).  The  growth  of  Free  Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) in Asia as estimated by Asian Development Bank (ADB) is shown 
Figure 1. 
Political considerations also features in decisions to establish RTAs, especially when 
governments  seek  to  consolidate  peace  and  increase  regional  security  as  well  as  to 
acquire greater bargaining power in multilateral negotiations by first tying in partner 
countries through regional commitments. 
There has been considerable debate in academic circles about the impact of RTAs on 
the member countries and on the rest of the world (Bhagwati and Krueger; Krueger 
1997). One view for RTAs has been that they improve resource allocation within a 
region  and  improve  income  for  member  countries  by  reducing  the  trade  barriers. 
Consumers are better off as they can buy the goods form the most efficient supplier at 
the lowest cost. This is so called trade creation effect for the members. On other hand, 
the  arguments  are  given  that  by  its  nature,  an  RTA  is  discriminatory  for  the  non-
members and members gain at the expanse of the non-members, resulting into trade 
diversion. In general an RTA would lead to some amount of both trade creation and 
trade  diversion  effects  (Krueger  1997).  If  the  trade  diversion  is  sufficiently  large 
relative to the trade creation effects, the RTA could conceivably end up being harmful 
to the member countries.  
In  this  research  paper,  we  empirically  analyze  the  ―India-Sri  Lanka  Free  Trade 
Agreement‖ (ISLFTA) to find out the trade creation or diversion effects of ISLFTA on 
rest of the world. We use the detailed trade data (HS 6 digit level) to study the trade 
effects under ISLFTA. The reason for choosing this FTA is that it is one of the few 
South-South Agreements that is working credibly and could be an example for other 
South-South Agreements to emulate. Holmes (2005) for example, also found that India 
Sri Lanka FTA is an effective Regional Trade Agreements and one of few effective 
South-South Agreements. Using gravity model she tested 122 FTAs and found that only 
46% of FTAs (including ISLFTA) were effectively implemented, in the sense that they   5 
positively and significantly increased the trade flows between member countries.  The 
success of ISLFTA has proved that if the concerns of smaller economy are taken into 
account with more favorable treatment then the size differential in the economies of the 
FTA partners do not matter. Being the first of its kind in the South Asian region, it has 
invited lot of interest among the exporters of the region.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief outline of ISLFTA , using 
trade flows makes an assessment about the effectiveness of this Agreement, Section 3 
presents Literature Review, Section 4 discusses the Methodology used for analysis of 
ISLFTA, Section 5 gives a brief outline of the theoretical model, Section 6 describes the 
data sources and limitations of data, Section 7 covers econometric issues and discusses 
the results, and finally, Section 8 concludes the paper summarizing the major finding of 
this study.  
2  Assessment of Trade under the ISLFTA   
The India Sri Lanka FTA was signed in 1998 and became operational in March 2000. 
Mutual  phased  tariff  concessions  on  different  products  on  6  digit  Harmonised 
Classification
3 (HS Code) basis have been granted by both the partners. Each side is 
having its negative lists
4 (no concessions), positive list (immediate full concessions) and 
a residual list
5  (phased  tariff  reductions)
  as  per  the  framework  of  ISLFTA.    The 
preferential trade under the FTA is governed by Rules of Origin
6, which specify the 
                                                 
3  The  Harmonised  Commodity  Description  and  Coding  System,  commonly  referred  to  as  the 
‗Harmonised System‘ or HS, is an international commodity classification system developed under the 
auspices of the Brussels-based Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), known today as the World Customs 
Organization  (WCO).  The  Harmonised  System  consists  of  21  sections  covering  99  Chapters,  1,241 
headings and over 5,000 commodity groups.  
4 Items, which are considered sensitive to the domestic industry by each partner to  FTA, are included in 
the respective negative list. The items in negative list of Sri Lanka are not entitled for any duty 
concessions for imports from India. The same rule applies in case of India‘s negative list for Sri Lankan 
products.  
5 The positive list and residual list are considered less sensitive to domestic interests by each partner and 
are included in the phased reduction of tariffs by both sides. All the three lists in respect of India and Sri 
Lanka  are  available  on  Sri  Lanka‘s  Department  of  Commerce  website. 
http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/indusrilanka_freetrade.php.  
6 The customs duties applied to imported goods may differ depending on the country from  which the 
goods were exported. Most industrial products, available on the market today, are produced in more than 
one country. For example, in the case of cotton shirts, it is possible that the cotton used in their 
production is manufactured in country A, the textile woven, dyed and printed in country B, the cloth cut   6 
criteria for a product to qualify for tariff concessions from the importing member. A 
comparison of India‘s (Sri Lanka‘s) average applied MFN tariff
7 with its preferential 
tariffs for Sri Lanka (India) is shown graphically in Figure 2 (Figure 3).  More details 
about the commitment of FTA partners can be referred at Annex I . 
After signing of ISLFTA, trade between India and Sri Lanka has increased manifold. 
India‘s import from Sri Lanka was US$ 45 million (0.10% of total imports) in 1999, 
which increased to US$ 499 million (0.29% ) in 2006; India‘s export to Sri Lanka was 
US$ 482 million (1.4% of total exports), which became US$ 2110 (1.74%) in 2006.  
Similarly,  Sri  Lanka‘s  import  form  India  in  1998  was  538  million  (9.49%),  which 
increased to US$ 1804 million (18.46% rank 1) in 2006. Sri Lanka‘s exports to India 
has grown from US$ 35 million (0.75%) in 1998 to US$ 490 million (7.26%, rank 3) in 
the year 2006. In this way India became the major trading partner for Sri Lanka after the 
signing of the Agreement.  Figure 4 (Figure 5) compares the growth of India‘s (Sri 
Lanka‘s)  imports  from  Sri  Lanka  (India)  with  the  growth  of  India‘s  (Sri  Lanka‘s) 
imports form the rest of the World since 1996. Comparing Sri Lanka‘s performance in 
two of its major export destinations (India and China), Figure 6 shows that Sri Lanka‘s 
share in  India‘s  total  imports  have been on rise after 2000.  On the other hand, Sri 
Lanka‘s  share  in  China‘s  total  imports  remained  almost  constant.    Figure  7  further 
shows share of some major exporters to India‘s total imports.  Although exports from 
US, EU and other countries (except China) to India‘s have declined during 1996 to 
2006, the share of Sri Lanka in Indian imports has increased consistently from 2000 to 
2005.  
The number of Sri Lanka‘s export items to India increased from 505 in 1996 to 1,062 in 
2006 items  on 6 digits  of HS  classification. There is  a visible shift in Sri  Lanka‘s 
exports  from  agricultural  products
8  to  manufacturing  goods
9.  The  major  products 
                                                                                                                                               
and stitched in country C and the shirts are packed for retail in country D before being exported to 
country E. Article VII together with Annex C of the India Sri Lanka FTA specify the rules of origin for 
the preferential treatment of goods by partner countries. Rules of origin criteria are crucial to ensure that 
preferential tariffs are not used to route the non-FTA country products to the Free Trade Area. 
7 The MFN principle is a principle of non-discrimination; it is a legal obligation under Article I of GATT 
to accord equal treatment to all other WTO members of a concession (here tariff) given to any trading 
partner by a member of WTO.  
8 Agricultural products are defined under Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.    7 
exported by Sri Lanka to India in 2006 included – Fats and Oils (22.3%), Copper and 
Articles  of  Copper  (8.6%),  Electrical  Machinery  (8.6%)    and  Spices,  Coffee,  Tea 
(6.2%). Similarly, India exported Mineral Fuel, Oil (22.44%), Vehicles (18.08%), Iron 
and Steel (4.54%), Machinery, Reactors, Boilers (4.22%) and Pharmaceutical Products 
(4.13%) to Sri Lanka.  
Figure 8 shows share of Sri Lankan products in India‘s total imports. It also shows Sri 
Lanka‘s  share  in  India‘s  imports  in  items  under  three  lists-  negative,  residual  and 
positive lists. As mentioned before, there has been an increase in total share of import of 
Sri Lankan goods from 0.10% in 1999 to 0.29% in 2006. The import from Sri Lanka 
has also increased in the items on the residual list from 0.2% in 1996 to 0.47% in 2006. 
It is noteworthy that there has been an increase in the imports even in the negative list 
items from 0.5% in 2001 to 1.19 % in 2006.  This could be mainly due to  the increased 
awareness to partners‘ market, smoothening of customs issues and improved access to 
ports of entry due to the increased engagement of partner countries on products having 
preferential tariffs on residual list, the so called ‗border effects‘ .  
However, the trade flows in the positive list items is relatively stagnant. This could be 
attributed to the fact that during ISLFTA negotiations, the immediate concessions were 
allowed by India on the products on which Sri Lanka does not have a comparative 
advantage.  Same could be said about the items on Sri Lanka‘s positive list.  This is a 
good  strategy  by  both  the  countries  to  prepare  their  domestic  industry  for  smooth 
adjustments due to FTA and make ISLFTA a workable agreement. 
All the above facts clearly show a marked increase in trade flows between India and Sri 
Lanka after implementation of ISLFTA in 2000. Trade creation between members and 
new products entering Indian market from Sri Lanka is evident after ISLFTA.  But we 
remind the reader that in this study, we will be limiting our econometric analysis to find 
trade creation or trade diversion effects of ISLFTA on rest of the world.  
                                                                                                                                               
9  Products  other  than  agricultural  products  can  be  categorized  as  manufactured  or  non-agricultural 
products.  The  product  classification  under  non-agricultural  products  is  still  being  discussed  at  Non 
Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations at WTO.       8 
3  Literature Review 
Despite its importance in the South Asian region, not many empirical studies have been 
conducted  to  access  the  impact  of  ISLFTA.  We  know  only  one  study,  which  has 
attempted to analyses the performance of this FTA by Mukerji and Kelegama (2007). 
Their study is based on the bilateral trade flows under different categories of products. 
Sector wise imports and exports figures are compared before and after the FTA. They 
have  concluded  that  the  two  countries  have  displayed  political  will  to  forge  ahead 
towards  economic  integration  and  the  considerable  size  disparity  between  the  two 
economies does not hinder bilateral free trade when appropriate special and differential 
treatment is accorded to the smaller country. Some new goods from Sri Lanka have 
found entry into the Indian market following the exchange of preferences. Finally, they 
have concluded that the economic benefits of free trade can and do override political 
problems. In the previous version of their study Mukerji, Kelegama and Jayawarhana 
(2004), they have found modest increase in trade in case of overall Indian imports from 
Sri Lanka, but considerable trade increase in case of Sri Lankan imports from India.   
Another report on evaluating economic performance of the FTA is ‗Joint Study Group 
on India –Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement‘ constituted by 
the partner Governments (JSG report, 2003)
10. JSG (2003) has concluded that ISLFTA 
promoted a 48% increase in bilateral trade between 2001 and 2002, and at present India 
is the largest source of imports into Sri Lanka, accounting for 14% of Sri Lanka‘s global 
imports. India is the fifth largest export destination for Sri Lankan goods accounting for 
3.6% of Sri Lanka‘s global exports.  Based on the success of ISLFTA, the JSG has 
recommended that the two countries enter into a Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) covering trade in services and investment and to build upon the 
ISLFTA by deepening and widening the coverage and binding of trade in goods.  
Most of the sophisticated econometric analysis of FTA has been on NAFTA. In order to 
decide about our methodology for this study, we surveyed studies conducted in the 
                                                 
10 JSG (2003) can be found at  
http://www.ips.lk/news/newsarchive/2003/20102003_islcepa_final/islcepa.pdf#search='India%20Sri%20
Lanka%20Trade%20Study'   9 
context of NAFTA, as we could draw a parallel to the NAFTA‘s trade analysis for our 
research.  Most of these studies have examined aggregate imports and exports, but there 
are only few studies focusing on disaggregate trade data.  
For example, Gould (1998) adopted a gravity model to find the impact of NAFTA on 
North American trade. Using aggregate quarterly trade flows in log first differences, he 
concluded that NAFTA may have stimulated the growth of US aggregate exports to 
Mexico but not US imports from Mexico. Gould (1998) also finds no trade diversion. In 
another gravity based approach, Soloaga and Winters (2001) find no distinguishable 
evidence of trade diversion  on non-members of  NAFTA. Similarly, Krueger (1999, 
2000), also adopted a gravity model approach and finds no evidence of trade diversion 
from the rest of the world after NAFTA came into operation. She finds that events other 
than NAFTA, such as Mexico‘s real exchange rate and its trade liberalization process, 
appear to have dominated the pattern of trade. Fukao, Okubo and Stern (2003) focused 
on disaggregated level (2 digit ) for selected manufactured goods , using a version of the 
gravity model developed for the percentage of  imports from a country to US total 
imports  of  an  industry.  Out  of  60  sectors  examined,  they  find  evidence  of  trade 
diversion in the textile and apparel sector, where Mexican exports have replaced lower-
cost Asian exports. This is in agreement with the findings of USITC (2003) study that 
also  found  evidence  of  trade  diversion  in  one  sector  (apparel)  out  of  68  sectors 
analyzed.  
The  most  ambitious  study  of  NAFTA  on  highly  disaggregated  (HS  6  digit)  is  by 
Romalis  (2005).  This  study  is  based  on  the  estimation  of  effects  of  FTA  on  trade 
volumes  and  prices.    It  identifies  demand  elasticities  by  developing  a  difference  in 
differences based method that exploits the variation across commodities and time in the 
US  tariff  preference  given  to  goods  produced  in  other  NAFTA  countries.  It  also 
identifies the supply elasticities by using tariffs as instruments for observed quantities.  
With the estimates of demand and supply elasticities, he estimates the change in welfare 
and trade due to NAFTA. He finds that 25-30% of the rise in Mexican exports to US 
since 1993 is due to Mexico‘s improved preferential treatment, implying substantial 
trade diversion. The welfare analysis of Trade Volumes is followed by Econometric   10 
Confirmation  of  Trade  Diversion  and  its  role  in  reducing  the  static  welfare  gains.  
Romalis (2005) develops a log difference equation of value of exports of commodity z 
from a non-NAFTA country (control country c’) to North America (country 1) and to 
the EU (country 2), grossed up for transport costs and tariffs.  He regresses the log-
difference  between  ‗country  1‘  and  ‗country  2‘  imports  from  control  country  c’  on 
preferential and MFN tariffs to estimate the trade diversion/creation.   
4  Methodology for Analysis of ISLFTA 
To find the trade creation or trade diversion effects of the India- Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement (ISLFTA) on rest of the World, we follow a slightly modified methodology 
adopted by Romalis (2005)
11. Ideally, we should also estimate the demand and supply 
elasticities for our key countries, for which we will need item -wise data on domestic 
production and consumption of goods. But Governments in India or Sri Lanka do not 
maintain such data on six digit HS, so we are unable to estimate these two parameters 
for our study. 
In order to use the variations in tariff at the product level like Romalis, we use 6 digit of 
HS 1996 product classification in our analysis.  We choose In dia and Sri Lanka, (the 
ISLFTA partners  --‗country  1‘)
12  as  our  key  countries.  We  first  choose  China  as 
‗country 2‘ and 165 countries grouped together as control country c’ (Annex II, Table 
A) to estimate the Trade Diversion/Creation due to ISLFTA.  The choice of China as 
‗country 2‘ to identify trade diversion is of minor significance to the empirical analysis. 
China  was  chosen  for  two  main  reasons.  Firstly,  its  detailed  trade  data  has  been 
available electronically. Secondly, China is having significant trade with for both of our 
key countries. The choice of China is further due to the reason that, it has substantial 
trade with most of the control countries c’ (Annex II Table A) but it does not have any 
substantial change in preferential trade relations with these countries during the study 
period (1996-2006). Control countries are the countries form the rest of the world, who 
have not  changed their  preferential trade relations  substantially with  either  ISLFTA 
                                                 
11  Romalis  J.  (2005),  ―NAFTA‘s  and  CUSFTA‘s  Impact  on  International  Trade‖,  NBER  WP11059, 
Cambridge. 
12 In this study, we will use the word country to mean often a group of countries. For example, India and 
Sri Lanka together are referred as ‗country 1‘ and Annex Table A to E countries as control country c‘.    11 
partners or China during 1996 to 2006.  We selected the control countries from the list 
of 180 countries supplying data to COMTRADE during the study period.  We dropped 
from this list the countries having special trade relationship with China during the study 
period--- Hong Kong, Macau and 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia,  Laos,  Malaysia,  Myanmar,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Thailand,  Vietnam). 
Again, we dropped China, India and Sri Lanka (our key countries). Further we deleted 
from the list European Union, as the individual member countries of EU are already 
covered in our list. This gives us a list of 165 countries as the control countries c’ for 
this study. (Annex II Table A). 
We  use  the  commodity  and  time  variation  in  the  tariff  preferences  allowed  under 
ISLFTA,  to  identify  the  ISLFTA‘s  effect  on  sourcing  of  commodities  from  a  non-
ISLFTA  country  c’  (control  countries)  to  ISLFTA  partners(country  1)  and  China 
(country 2). The idea is when FTA causes a preferential treatment to the Sri Lankan 
goods, the consumers in India, tend to substitute the preferential goods for the goods 
from  other  sources  (including  the  domestic  production).  Similarly,  the  Sri  Lankan 
consumer will substitute the goods of Indian origin, if they have preferential treatment 
compared to the goods from rest of the trading partners. On the other hand, for the 
goods, where the ISLFTA does not offer new preference (i.e. when the MFN tariff rates 
are almost zero), the impact of ISLFTA comes through the ‗border effects‘ that go 
beyond the tariff liberalization, as could be seen from the increased import volumes of 
commodities on ISLFTA negative list.  
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, in the second part of our analysis, we 
use 6 other countries as ‗country 2‘.  We select ‗country 2‘ based on the principle 
mentioned above (i.e. when choose ‗country 2‘ as China). We choose United States 
(US), European Union (EU15) , Indonesia,  Australia, Switzerland and Malaysia for this 
purpose. The Control Countries c‘ for US, EU15, Australia and Switzerland are listed in 
Annex II Table B (170 countries), Table C (144 countries), Table D (173 countries),   12 
Table  E  (159  countries)  and  respectively.  The  control  countries  when  we  choose 
Indonesia or Malaysia as  our  ‗country 2‘  are in Annex II Table A (165 countries)
13.  
5  Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
In  this  section,  we  provide  a  short  outline  of  the  model,  which  rather  than  being 
exhaustive, highlights the needed features for the empirical strategy
14. In this model, the 
firms are assumed to produce goods under the perfect competition.  Trade is assumed to 
be driven by varieties and the commodities are differentiated by its source of origin. 
The FTA causes a shift in sourcing of varieties by consumers by substituting the goods 
from the source having preferential access to the FTA partners‘ market.  
In every period t consumers in each country c are assumed to maximize Cobb-Douglas 
utilities of their consumption of the output of each industry () ct Qz with the fraction of 
income spent on industry z being () c bz. 
The utilities for consumers in country c are as: 
                                               
1
0
( )ln ( ) ct c ct U b z Q z dz                                               (1) 
                                                        
1
0
( ) 1 c b z dz                                                       (2) 
The outputs of a country‘s firms are identical products, but different countries produce 
different  products  in  the  same  industry.  () ct Qz   can  be  interpreted  as  a  sub-utility 
function that depends on the quantity of each variety of z consumed.   () ct Qz  is defined 
as under: 
                                                 
13 The control countries, when we choose Indonesia or Malaysia as our ‗country 2‘ are same as those 
when ‗country 2‘ chosen is China (Table A) .  This is due to the fact that both Indonesia and Malaysia are 
among the ten ASEAN countries having preferential trade relations with China. 
14Here we focus on demand side only. For complete equilibrium analysis for FTA, Romalis (2005) may 
be referred.   13 












Q z q z                                         (3) 
where, elasticity of substitution  z  > 1 and  ' ()
D
ct c qz denote the quantity consumed in 
country c of commodity z produced in country c’. 
The  demand  function  in  country  c,  for  a  commodity  z  from  country  c’,  ' ()
D
ct c qz  is 
assumed  to  be  a  CES  function.  The  demand  for  ' c z is  assumed  to  depend  on  seven 
variables --  ' ( ( ))
s
t t c a q z : the marginal cost of production of commodity in country c’; 
' ( ) 1 ct c z :  the  ad-valorem  tariff
15,16  imposed  on  z  from  c’  by  country  c;  ' () ct c gz: 
transport costs for international trade;  ˆ
ctz P : the ideal price index for commodity z in 
country  c;  ct Y :  the  GDP  of  country  c;  () c bz:the  expenditure  weights  in  the  utility 
functions for country c , which is the consumption in country c of each HS 6-digit 
product (regardless of source) divided by the GDP of country c;  and the mean elasticity 
of demand  ; as per the following log linear equation: 
     ' ' ' ' ' ˆ ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ( 1)ln ln ( )
D
ct c t c ct c ct c ctz c c ct q z a z z g z P b z Y      (4) 
where ˆ
ctz P , the ideal price index for commodity z in country c is defined as: 






ˆ ( ( )) ctz t ct ct c
c
P a g z                                          (5) 
The transport costs for international trade are assumed to be in the ‗iceberg‘ form i.e. 
' () ct c gz units must be shipped from country c’ for 1 unit to arrive in country c. 
                                                 
15 Ad valorem tariffs are taxes that are levied as a fraction of the value of the imported goods (for 
example, a 15% India‘s tariff on imported t-shirt). 
16 On some products the duties are imposed as specific tariffs (or  duties). Specific duties are levied as a 
fixed charge for each unit of goods imported (for example, $ 2.5 per kg of yarn, or $ 2.5 per pc of shirt) 
and we have to convert them to ad valorem equivalents following NAMA methodology.    14 
If  we  denote  country  c  in  equation  (4)  as  ‗country  1‘  (say  both  ISLFTA  countries 
together) , the demand function for ‗country 1‘ for commodity z from country c’ (non-
ISLFTA country) becomes:  
     1 ' ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 ' 1 ˆ ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ( 1)ln ln ( )
D
t c t c t c t c tz c t q z a z z g z P b z Y        (6) 
We have a similar log linear CES demand function for ‗country 2‘ (say China) for 
commodity z from country c’ (non-ISLFTA country):  
    2 ' ' 2 ' 2 ' 2 2 ' 1 ˆ ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ( 1)ln ln ( )
D
t c t c t c t c tz c t q z a z z g z P b z Y        (7) 
By combining (6) and (7), we can compare the value of exports of commodity z from 
country  c’  (non-ISLFTA,  e.g.  Annex  II  Table  A  countries)  to  country  1  (ISLFTA 
region) and to country 2 (China), grossed up for transport costs and tariffs.  
1 1 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 1 1
2 2 2 ' 2 ' 2 ' 2 2 2
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ln ( 1)ln ( 1)ln ( 1)ln ln (8) ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
D
t t t t c t c t c tz t
D
t t t t c t c t c t tz
a g q z z g z P b z Y
a g q z z g z b z Y P
 
This helps us to get rid of ( ( ))
s
t t c a q z : the marginal cost of production of commodity in 
country c, which we do not know.  
Trade Creation for rest of the world may result form ISLFTA, because tariff reductions 
among partners directly lowers  1 ˆ
tz P  in the ISLFTA region (country 1) as one of the 
member of the ISLFTA would ultimately displace the higher cost domestic producers of 
commodity  z  in  the  partner  country.  With  the  result  consumers  in  ISLFTA  region 
(country 1) will have more income to buy goods from the non-ISLFTA country c‘ (rest 
of the world) . The exports of non-FTA country c‘ to ISLFTA region will increase 
resulting into trade creation for rest of the world.  
On the other hand, it is possible that due to preferential tariffs, a partner country‘s 
production might displace the lower cost suppliers from non-ISLFTA country c‘ in the 
ISLFTA region (country 1). Trade diversion  for rest of the world may result because   15 
tariff reductions on FTA partners‘ output directly lower  1 ˆ
tz P , thereby depressing exports 
from other countries c’ to India and Sri Lanka.   
A regression of the log-difference between ISLFTA partners‘ combined imports and 
‗country 2‘ imports from the control countries on preferential and MFN tariffs should 
reveal trade diversion or trade creation. In the absence of a closed-form solution for 
how prices respond to tariff changes we estimate
17 the following equation:  
'




ln ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )
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Ind t SL SL t Ind Ind t MFN SL t MFN
tc
t MFN z t zt
Mz




where  ' () FTAt c Mz  is the ISLFTA (combined India and Sri Lanka) import of commodity 
z from the control countries c’ measured on a CIF basis and  2' () tc Mzis the ‗country 2‘ 
import  of  commodity  z  from  the  control  countries  c’  measured  similarly.  The 
explanatory  variables  are  preferential  and  MFN  tariffs.    For  example,  , () Ind t SL z is 
India‘s tariff on product z imported from Sri Lanka plus one, and , () Ind t MFN z  is India‘s 
MFN tariff on product z plus one. The above equation, compared to equation (8) helps 
us to get rid of ˆ
ctz P : the ideal price index for commodity z in country c.  We also assume 




















  are 
captured by full sets of product ( z D ) and year ( t D ) fixed effects and a disturbance term 
( zt ) that is independent of the tariffs and fixed effects. The sum of the coefficients  on 
the preferential tariffs (β1 and β2) may reveal the rise (or fall) in exports from the 
control  countries  c’  to  ISLFTA  region  relative  to  ‗country  2‘  that  results  from  a  1 
percent reduction in intra-ISLFTA tariffs. If the sum of β1 and β2 is negative (positive), 
it will show us that trade from non-ISLFTA member countries is created (or diverted) as 
a result of ISLFTA.   
 
                                                 
17 Following Romalis (2005), section 4 D.   16 
6  Data, Sources and its Characteristics 
We focus our study for the period 1996 to 2006 i.e. 5 years before ISLFTA and 6 years 
after ISLFTA by using 6 digit HS 1996 classification data.  Basically, we use two types 
of data --- the applied tariff data
18  and trade data. The major source of data for this 
study is World Bank‘s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database and Global 
Trade Atlas (GTA) of Global Trade Information (GTI) Services. WITS provides access 
to three other important sources of data – TRAINS (by UNCTAD), COMTRADE (by 
UNSD) and IDB (by WTO) and GTI is one of the leading supplier of international 
merchandise trade data. As we use highly rich dataset for our regression analysis, for 
transparency purposes, it would be useful to discuss the challenges we faced and how 
we tackled them.   
6.1  Tariff Data: 
We prefer to use tariff data form TRAINS, IDB and National Governments in the order 
of preference
19.  
Tariff data for India—Tariff data for India was collected from three sources ---IDB 
for  years 1996, 2000, 2002; TRAINS  for  years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005; and 
Indian Government for years 2003 and 2006. There are four major issues with Indian 
tariff data. First, we do not have data for the year 1998, for which we use the 1997 data 
as a proxy. Second, the data for the years 1996 to 2001 is on HS 1996 classification
20 
                                                 
18 Actual tariffs or import duties applied by WTO member countries on their imports, as opposed to tariff 
rates that are bound or committed. 
19 There are two reasons for using the data sources in this order of preference.  First, we need all tariff 
data on ad-valorem basis not on specific duty basis.  Our key countries have specific duties on some of 
the tariff lines (for example, India 271 HS lines for 2000 to 2006; China 27 lines in 2001 and 23 lines in 
2005; and Sri Lanka 29 in 1998 and 64 lines in 2004). Using TRAINS under WITS provide an automatic 
conversion of these specific duties to ad-valorem equivalents using WTO NAMA methodology. Second, 
in case the national tariffs are recorded on HS 8 digit basis; TRAINS under WITS also averages the 
tariffs to the corresponding HS 6 digits for all the tariff lines. Our second preference is for the IDB under 
WITS. It again converts the HS 8 digit tariffs to average tariffs on HS 6 digit level, but the IDB does not 
provide an automatic conversion of specific duties to the ad-valorem equivalents as provided by TRAINS 
database.  Our last preference is for the Government tariff data, as these are not availab le electronically 
and are mostly are on HS 8 digit level. We have to manually calculate the averages for the corresponding 
HS 6 digit tariff and put the data in electronic form before using for our analysis.  
20 HS 1996 classification has 5113 items (or products) on six digit basis.    17 
and for the  years 2002  to  2006 the data is  on HS  2002 classification
21. As we are 
working with HS 1996 for our study, we use concordance tables from WITS to convert 
the linewise tariff data from HS 2002 to HS 1996 for the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 
and 2006. Third, conversion of specific duties on 271 Textiles and   Clothing sector 
products to ad-valorem equivalents for the years 2000 to 2006. For the years 2001, 
2004, 2005 we source tariff data from TRAINS.  The WITS provided an automatic 
conversion of these specific duties to ad -valorem equivalents using WTO NAMA 
methodology
22.  For the years 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2006 i.e. when we do not have data 
from TRAINS, we cannot get such ad-valorem equivalents through the WITS.  So for 
the years 2000, 2002 (when we source data from IDB) and for the years 2003 and 2006 
(when we use Indian Government data), we use the ad-valorem equivalents of specific 
duties from the nearest year
23, available from TRAINS.  Fourth, the missing data on HS 
lines within a year. These are only a few lines, so we use the applied tariff rate on 
nearest HS line from the same year to handle this issue.  
Tariff data for Sri Lanka-- Tariff data for Sri Lanka was collected from two sources --
-IDB for  years 1998, 2001 (for preferential tariff), 2003;  TRAINS for years 1997,  
2000, 2001 (for MFN tariff), 2004, 2005 and 2006. Again there are four major issues 
with Sri Lankan tariff data. First, we do not have data for the years 1996, 1999 and 
2002. We take tariffs of the nearest available year as proxies for the missing years
24.  
Second,    Sri  Lanka‘s  applied  tariff  rates  is  for  the  year  1997  is  in  HS  1988/92 
classification
25; for 1998, 2000, 2001 data is in HS 1996 and for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
                                                 
21 HS 2002 classification has 5224 items (or products) on six digit basis 
22  WITS  provides  four  different  ways  of  conversion  of  specific  duties  to  ad -valorem  equivalents 
(AVEs)—UNCTAD Method 1, Method 2, WTO Agriculture Method and WTO NAMA method. As most 
of our trade is of non-agricultural goods, we prefer to choose WTO NAMA method. Choosing other 
methodology may not make any changes in our results and conclusions of the study. 
23 Indian Government introduced specific duties, since 2000, on 271 items of Textile and Clothing sector 
as  ‗  x  %  or  Rs  y  per  unit,  whichever  is  higher‘.  It  was  observed  that  all  most  all  the  ad-valorem 
equivalents of the specific components of tariff are higher than the corresponding ad-valorem duties, so 
effectively the specific duties are the applied rates of import duties. India did not change the specific duty 
components on these 271 products even though the government lowered the ad-valorem components on 
these product lines for the period 2000 to 2006.  That is why the use of ad-valorem equivalents of specific 
duties from the nearest year is perfectly justified.  
24 For the year 1996, we take tariffs from 1997; for the year 1999 we use 2000 tariffs and for the year 
2002 , we use the data of 2003. It is observed that there is not much difference between applied tariffs in 
2001 and 2003 so the use of 2003 data for the 2002 seems justified. 
25 HS 1988/92 classification has 5020 items (or products) on six digit basis.   18 
2006  data  is  in  HS  2002  classification.  We  again  use  WITS  concordance  tables  to 
convert  the  data
26  to HS 1996 classificatio n. Third, the issue of specific duties on 
different items in different years. For example, Sri Lanka has specific duties on 29 tariff 
lines in 1998 but on 64 lines in 2004. For conversion to ad-valorem equivalents, we use 
the data of the nearest available  year from TRAINS. Fourth, the missing data on HS 
lines within a year. This issue is handled by using the applied tariff rates from the 
nearest HS line from the same year. 
Tariff data for ‘country 2’ —Due to China‘s entry into WTO as late as in 2001, its 
tariff data is easily available. Tariff data for China was collected from two sources --- 
TRAINS for years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
IDB for the year 2002. WITS concordance table was used to convert the data from HS 
2002  (for  the  years  2002  ,  2003,  2004,  2005  and  2006)  to  HS  1996  classification. 
Otherwise,  the  China‘s  data  for  the  years  1996  to  2001  is  available  on  HS  1996. 
Similarly, the tariff data for United States, EU15, Indonesia, Australia, Switzerland and 
Malaysia is also collected from TRAINS and IDB through WITS. The issues of missing 
data,  concordance  of  HS  classifications  and  specific  duties,  wherever  required  are 
handled in the same manner as described above in case of India or Sri Lanka‗s tariff 
data. 
6.2  Trade  Data
27:    To  run  the  regression  for  equation  (9),  we  need  imports  by 
ISLFTA region (‗country 1‘) form control countries c‘ on HS 1996 at 6 digit level and 
imports by China (‗country 2‘) from control countries c‘ at the same level of details for 
the period 1996 to 2006.  We get imports data for India and China (country 2) from the 
COMTRADE  for  all  the  years.  Similarly,  for  US,  EU  15,  Indonesia,  Australia, 
Switzerland  and  Malaysia  as  ‗country  2‘  trade  data  is  easily  available  from 
COMTRADE. 
                                                 
26 We observe that for 76 items from HS 1998/92 classification that do not have any concordance with the 
HS 1996 classification. All these items were used before 1995. So we drop them form our analysis as we 
are concentrating only on data from 1996 to 2006. 
27  Trade data is relatively easily  available  for all the countries   on COMTRADE. It understood that 
compared to the tariff data, the trade data is unimportant for the purposes of tariff negotiations at WTO. 
Due to negotiation sensitivities, it is possible that some countries do not want to share full tariff data.   19 
A caveat needs to be mentioned for Sri Lanka‘s import data. The import data for Sri 
Lanka is available only for the years 1998 (on IDB) and 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005 on COMTRADE.  For the years 1996, 1997, 2000, and 2006 we need to use 
alternative sources of data.  We use import data for the years 2000 and 2006 for Annex 
II  Table  A  control  countries  from  the  Global  Trade  Atlas  (GTA)
28.  Due to data 
constraints for Sri Lanka
29 for 1996 and 1997, we decided to use mirror data for exports 
from control countries c’ to Sri Lanka as imports by Sri Lanka from control countries 
for these two years to get the complete dataset for the study period
30.   
7  Estimation of Results and Discussion  
Finally, we have seven different panels. Each panel is highly balanced with T (11 years) 
observations  for  each  of  the  N  individuals  (over  5000  products).    To  estimate  the 
parameters of equation (9), we choose both the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random 
Effects (RE) model
31. These two models allow for the heterogeneity across panel uni ts 
and across time. We consider these two alternatives in the Hausman test framework, 
fitting both models and comparing their common coefficient estimates. As we might 
                                                 
28 The GTA has data for the years starting form 1998.  
29 For Annex Table B, C, D and E control countries we use mirror data on imports by Sri Lanka for years 
1996, 1997, 2000 and 2006 due to unavailability of Sri Lanka‘s import data as reporter to COMTRADE. 
30 There may be difference of 5% to 6 % between the actual imports recorded by Sri Lanka (data not 
available) and the mirror data of imports by Sri Lanka from control countries (data available). This 
difference is due the fact that in COMTRADE, the imports are recorded CIF (Cost insurance and freight) 
while the exports are recorded FOB (free on board).  Finally, since we use the combined imports by India 
(import data available for the period under study) and Sri Lanka (import data ava ilable for 1998 to 2006 
and mirror data for 1996 and 1997) from control countries c‘. As India is relatively a large trading partner 
in ISLFTA region, when we merge the two import data to get the combined imports by ISLFTA partners, 
the difference due to CIF and FOB values for 1996 and 1997 in Sri Lankan data gets further diluted. 
31 We do not use pooled OLS method to estimate our model  it it i t it y x u v  as it would ignore 
the nature of the panel data and assumes ,, j j i t . This model will be highly restrictive and can 
have heteroskedasticity across panel units or serial correlation within panel units. We may choose the 
Between Estimators (BE), Fixed Effects (FE) or the Random Effects (RE) Model to estimate the panel 
coefficients of our model. In the BE, the group means of y are regressed on the group means of x in a 
regression of N observations. This estimator also ignores all the time variations in y and when the  i u  are 
correlated with any of the regressors in the model, the zero-conditional-mean assumption does not hold 
and the between estimator produces inconsistent results. Finally, we are left with the FE and RE models 
that allows for the heterogeneity across panel units and across time. If the  i u  are uncorrelated with the 
regressors, then we can use the RE, but if the  i u are correlated with the regressors, then we use the FE 
model.     20 
expect from the different point estimates generated by RE estimator, the Hausman test's 
null hypothesis---that the RE estimator is consistent --is soundly rejected (Table 2). The 
individual effects do appear to be correlated with the regressors; hence our results are 
based on the Fixed Effects Model (FE). 
A summary of the results using Fixed Effects model for seven panels are given in Table 
1. Interpretation of these results will essentially provide the evidence, whether ISLFTA 
have been trade diverting (or trade creating). For interpreting the results, we refer to the 
log-difference of combined imports of ISLFTA partners and imports of ‗country 2‘ 
from the control countries c‘ , given by equation (9).  
Column 1 of Table 1 gives the estimates of coefficients, when we use China as our 
‗country 2‘.  The results shows that the sum of the coefficients on the preferential tariffs 
(β1 and β2) is positive, suggesting that ISLFTA may be trade diverting for non-ISLFTA 
members (control countries c‘). It shows that a 1% reduction in ISLFTA preferential 
tariffs will cause 1.12 % reduction in imports by the ISLFTA countries from control 
countries c‘ relative to imports by China from same control countries. All coefficients 
except 2   are highly significant. The reduction in tariffs by India   for Sri Lankan 
products is a major contributor to creation of more trade for Sri Lanka at the expense of 
control countries c‘. The MFN applied average tariff by India in 2006 is 20.79%, while 
its tariff on Sri Lankan products is only 4.25% (Figure 2). On the other hand there is not 
much difference between Sri Lanka‘s MFN (11.82% in 2006) and preferential applied 
tariffs  (9.08%  in  2006)  (Figure  3).    This  along  with  the  fact  that  India  is  a  major 
importer  of  control  country  c‘  products,  explains  the  significance  of  β1  and  non-
significance of β2.  The other coefficients i.e. β3, β4 and β5 are of expected (negative) 
sign and are highly significant. A reduction in MFN tariffs by the ISLFTA countries 
would increase the exports to this region from the control countries c‘. Similarly, if 
country  2  (China)  reduces  its  MFN  tariff,  the  exports  from  control  countries  c‘  to 
country 2 will increase. 
In  the  second  part  of  our  analysis,  we  substitute  US,  EU-15,  Indonesia,  Australia, 
Switzerland and Malaysia respectively as ‗country 2‘ thereby forming six more panels.    21 
The control countries c‘ also change to countries listed in Annex II Table B, Table C, 
Table A, Table D, Table E and Table A respectively. The results of regression for these 
panels are reported in column 2 to 7 (Table 1). The sum of coefficients β1 and β2 is 
negative in all these six cases. For example, in column 2, when we ‗country 2‘ is US, 
we have sum of β1 and β2 equals –3.080 . This shows that as per estimates of our 
model, when the ISLFTA countries reduce preferential tariffs by 1%, this results in an 
increase of 3% in exports to the ISLFTA partners from Table B control countries c‘ 
compared to exports from the same control countries to US. Once again, coefficients β3 
and  β4  are  of  expected  (negative)  sign  and  highly  significant,  showing  that  a  1% 
reduction in MFN tariffs by the ISLFTA countries would increase the exports from 
control countries c‘ to this region by around 4% compared to exports to US from the 
same countries.  β5 in this case is insignificant. All the coefficients in next five panels in 
Table 1 (except β5 for in case of EU15, Switzerland and Malaysia as ‗country2‘ and β4 
in case of Australia and Switzerland as ‗country 2‘) are strongly significant and can be 
interpreted similarly.  Overall, we estimate that a 1% reduction in ISLFTA partners‘ 
preferential tariffs results in 2.6% to 4.9 % increase in exports from  control countries c‘ 
to ISLFTA members compared to the exports from countries c‘ to  ‗country 2‘.  
As  most  of  the  coefficients  of  our  model,  including  the  rho  and  F-test  statistics
32 
establish the significance of our model; we conclude that our model is able to assess 
reasonably well the trade effects of ISLFTA. 
One issue, which needs explanation is the difference in trade effects in pan el 1 (trade 
diversion) and six other panels (trade creation) of Table 1. Two reasons can be given to 
explain this difference. First, in panel 1, ‗country 2‘ (China) is the largest exporter to 
ISLFTA partners (1
st to India and 3
rd largest to Sri Lanka, in 2006).  When we select the 
control countries c‘ with China as ‗country 2‘, we have to exclude China from the list of 
control countries c‘.  This affects our results by way of exclusion of almost 16% of 
exports to ISLFTA partners in 2006.  Second, we also have to exclude some other 
countries  (e.g.  Hong  Kong,  Malaysia,  Taiwan,  Indonesia  and  Thailand)  having 
                                                 
32 Rho, F test, F statistic and R2 have similar interpretation for all of our seven panels, we discuss them 
together in detail in the Note below Table 1.   22 
preferential relations with China from the list of control countries c‘. These countries 
are among the top 10 exporters to ISLFTA region. These countries together with China 
constitute almost 30% of exports to ISLFTA countries in 2006. This produces biased 
estimates to our model by excluding a large percentage of imports by ISLFTA partners. 
On the other hand, when other six countries are substituted as ‗country 2‘, we have to 
exclude only 3 to 10% of total imports by ISLFTA region for estimations of equation 
(9).  Moreover, we find consistent and strongly significant results for our model form 
column 2 to 7 in Table 1.  We, therefore, tend to give more weightage to the results 
obtained  from  panels  having  US,  EU15  ,  Indonesia  ,  Australia,  Switzerland  and 
Malaysia as  ‗country 2‘.  The results show that a 1% reduction in preferential tariffs 
among ISLFTA partners will increase  2.6% to 4.9% exports from  control countries c‘ 
to ISLFTA partners as compared to the exports from control countries c‘ to ‗country 2‘ .  
8  Conclusion  
We have shown in this study that ISLFTA has a slight trade creation effect on non-
ISLFTA countries. The consumers in India and Sri Lanka are able to get some of the 
products from the most competitive suppliers within the region; with the result they are 
able to consume more goods with the same income. Apparently, this has a trade creation 
effect for the non-members.  We have also shown that ISLFTA is one of the few South-
South Agreements, which are working effectively. The success of ISLFTA has proved 
that if the concerns of smaller economy are taken into account with more favorable 
treatment, then the size differential in the economies of the FTA partners do not matter.  
Immediately, after the Agreement, there has been a jump in the trade flows, which 
could be attributed to the increased engagement of partner countries on products having 
preferential access and due to the ‗border effect‘. We have not gone into the sector 
specific analysis in this study which could be an interesting area for further research on 
ISLFTA.   23 
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Data Source: ADB, Manila 
Figure by Author  
 
Note: The numbers include -- Proposed, Under Negotiation, Signed and Under Implementation Free 
Trade Agreements.  
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Data Source: WITS, World Bank 
Figure by Author 
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Figure 4 :  Growth in India’s Imports from Sri Lanka and Rest of the World (1996 




Data Source: COMTRADE 
Figure by Author 
 
 
Figure 5 :  Growth in Sri Lanka’s Imports from India and Rest of the World (1996 





Data Source: COMTRADE 
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Data Source: COMTRADE 
Figure by Author 
 
 
Figure 7:  Share of Some Major Exporters and Sri Lanka  
to India’s Total Imports 
 
 
Data Source: COMTRADE 
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Figure 8:  Sri Lanka’s Share of India’s Total Imports on Items 
Under Different List of ISLFTA 
 




Data Source: COMTRADE 

























































Negative List: % SL Imp
Positive List: % SL Imp
Residual List: % SL Imp
Total Imports: % SL Imp  30 
Table 1 
Trade Diversion/Creation Effects from India Sri Lanka FTA 
  
*** shows coefficient is significant at 1% level. 
**   shows coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
*    shows coefficient is significant at 10% level. 
N= number of observations, n= number of groups, k= number of dependent variables. 
For explanation of various entries in the above table, refer note on the next page.  




Diversion  Creation  Creation  Creation  Creation  Creation  Creation 
































-0.995   
(.075) 
-13.34*** 


















-3.860   
(0.286) 
-13.48*** 



























































































Table A  Table B  Table C  Table A  Table D  Table E  Table A 
           
Number of 
Observations 
49721  49775  50637  48504  48652  45702  46661 
Number of 
products 
4987  5013  5049  4998  4942  4916  4935 
R-sq within  0.005  0.058  0.054  0.066  0.057  0.059  0.074 
rho (variation 
due to  ui ) 
0.678  0.812  0.784  0.626  0.783  0.802  0.677 
F(n-1, N-n-k) 
































(0.000)   31 
Note on Table 1: 
i)  # lm (the dependent variable) 
 = log (Import in India +Sri Lanka form the control countries) – log (Import in ‗country 
2‘ form the control countries c‘) for each HS 6 digit product for each year (1996 to 
2006), i.e. log-difference between FTA partners‘ combined imports and ‗country 2‘  
import form the Control Countries. 
ii)  The Control Countries are selected based on ‗country 2‘ chosen for analysis. The 
Control Countries are shown in Table A, B, C, D  and E. Control Countries include all 
the countries reporting the data to COMTRADE, minus India, Sri Lanka, ‗country 2‘ 
and  other  countries  having  preferential  trade  arrangement  with  ‗country  2‘.  For 
example, in  case of China, the Annex  II Table A Control  Countries  include--- 180 
COMTRADE  countries  minus  China,  India,  Sri  Lanka,  Hong  Kong  China,  Macao 
China,  and  ASEAN  countries  (Brunei  Darussalam,  Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) i.e. 165 countries.  
iii)   The dependent variable (lm) is regressed on tariffs on 6 digit products of HS 1996 
classification applied by 
(a) India on Sri Lankan imports—preferential tariffs, 
(b) Sri Lanka on Indian imports—preferential tariffs, 
(c) India on imports from control countries—MFN tariffs, 
(d) Sri Lanka on imports from control countries—MFN tariffs, 
(e) the ‗country 2‘ on imports form control countries—MFN tariffs. 
iv)   We use simple average of applied ad valorem tariffs for all products at 6 digit level. 
For the products with specific duties, we calculate the ad-valorem equivalents form 
WITS by using methodology adopted in NAMA negotiations at WTO. 
v)    The Import of products is measured on a CIF basis, the units used are $‘000 per 
year.  
vi)  We use Product Specific Effects and Time Specific Effects in our model and use 
Panel Data Fixed Effects methodology for all our estimations.  
viii)   The first row of the above table reports Trade Diversion or Trade Creation effects 
based on sign of the sum of coefficients ( 12 ) of preferential tariffs charged by FTA 
partners .  The second row reports the sum of the coefficients  12  (the first two 
coefficients reported below). The p- value is based on a F-test that the coefficients on 
the regressors are all jointly zero. The p -values are reported in the brackets below 
12 .  A positive significant sum of the coefficients 12 , indicate Trade Diversion 
as a result of the ISLFTA. A negative significant sum of the two coefficients indicates 
Trade Creation Effects resulting from the ISLFTA.   
ix)    The figures reported below the tarif f coefficients in the brackets are the standard 
errors (se). The t-values are shown below the se in each cell of the table. The significant 
t-values are marked by asterisks at acceptable level of significance.  
x)      _cons :  Stata fits a model, in which the ui (i.e. individual specific fixed effects Dz) 
are taken as deviations from one constant term, displayed as _cons. 
x)     The number of observations with different ‗country 2‘ varies due the change in 
products  imported  by  these  countries  from  the  control  countries.  In  addition,  the 
difference also arises because; we have dropped the observations with extremely high 
tariffs (more than 65%).    32 
xi)      R
2 (within) is reported in the fourth last row.  Stata command xtreg, fe obtains its 
estimates by performing OLS on transformed model, so the R
2 reported do not have all 
the properties of the OLS  R
2 .  
xi)      rho  values  estimate  that  67  %  to  81%  of  variation  in  log-difference  between 
combined imports of  ISLFTA partners  and imports of ‗country 2‘ from  the control 
countries c‘ (i.e. dependent variable ,lm) is due to the product specific differences ui 
(i.e. Dz) . 
xii)     F (n-1, N-n-k) :  F test provides a test of the null hypothesis Ho that  all ui =0 . In 
other words,  we wish to test whether the individual specific heterogeneity of   ui is 
necessary i.e. are there distinguishable intercept terms across units?  A rejection of this 
Ho indicates that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates. 
xiii)    F (k, N-n-k):  F statistics to test the null Ho that the coefficients on the regressors 
(dependent variables) are jointly zero i.e. whether our model is overall significant. A 
rejection of Ho implies that our model is overall significant. The F-statistic in all the 
cases shows high significance level for our model as a tool to explain the trade effects 
of the FTA. 
   33 
Table 2 
 





  China  United 
States 
EU 15  Indonesia 
ln Ind SL   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
0.845 0.775     -1.086 
-1.006        
-0.742 
-0.677        
-1.034 
-0.985        
ln SL Ind   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
0.277  0.375             -1.994 
-2.337         
-2.188 
-2.622          
-2.910 
-3.114         
ln Ind MFN  fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-1.484 
-1.366            
-2.156 
-2.199         
-2.341 
-2.245        
-2.716 
-2.879         
ln SL MFN   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-0.873  
-0.792           
0.626 
0.282         
0.373 
0.172         
-1.868 
-1.537        





-1.050           
0.120 
-0.094         
-0.413 
-1.025         
-0.8417      




  37.42 
(0.000) 











  Australia  Switzerland  Malaysia 
ln Ind SL   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-0.871 
-0.769        
-1.195 
-1.081        
-0.995 
-0.917        
ln SL Ind   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-1.788 
-2.079         
-2.074 
-2.527         
-3.860    
-3.918         
ln Ind MFN  fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-2.308 
-2.316         
-2.737 
-2.790         
-2.057 
-2.045        
ln SL MFN   fix (b) 
ran (B) 
-0.221    
 -0.504         
-0.369 
-0.694         
-0.797 
-0.908         





-5.509         
-0.700 
-0.584        
-0.181     











b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg,  
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)] (b-B) 
 
As we might expect from the different point estimate generated by the RE estimator, the 
Hausman  test's  null  hypothesis  --that  the  RE  estimator  is  consistent  --  is  soundly 
rejected.  The  product-level  individual  effects  do  appear  to  be  correlated  with  the 
regressors.   34 
 
Annex I 
ISLFTA – Commitment of Member Countries in Brief
33 
 
Mutual phased tariff concessions on 5112 items on 6 digits (HS1996) have been agreed. 
An eight year time-table was specified for phasing out tariffs on all tariff lines, except 
the items on negative list of each country.  
 
India’s commitment: 
i)  Duty free access to 1,351 items upon entry into force of the Agreement 
in March 2000. 
ii)  Duty concession of 25% on 528 items in HS chapters 51 to 56, 58 to 60 
and 63.  
iii) Margin of preference of 50% on the remaining items of 2,799 increased 
to 100% in two stages in March 2003 
iv) Duty concession of 50% on 233 tariff items of ready made garments and 
5 tariff items of tea.  This concession is under a tariff rate quota (TRQ)
34 
of 15 million kg on tea and of 8 million pieces on garments. 
v)  Negative List of 429 items from rubber, paper, plastic, coconuts, 
alcoholic beverages and textile sector  
 
Sri Lanka’s commitment:  
i)  Duty free access to 319 items upon entry into force of the Agreement in 
March 2000.  
ii)  Margin of preference of 50% on 839 items deepened to 70%, 90% and 
100% at the end of 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively 
iii) For 2,724 items, the tariff brought down to 
35% by March 2003 
70% by March 2006 
100% by March 2008  
iv) Negative List of 1180 items from agriculture, automobile, electrical 
machinery, aluminum, copper, Iron & Steel, rubber, paper and plastic . 
Rules of Origin:       
i)  the domestic value addition should be 35%;  if the raw material /inputs 
are sourced from one member by the other, the value addition is reduced 
to 25% within the overall limit of 35%.  
ii)  inputs to undergo substantial transformation at 4 digit level of customs 
Harmonized Code; and  
iii)  a list of operations such as simple packing, cutting and assembly, have 
been defined which do not qualify for preferential market access.  
                                                 
33 For complete details, the interested reader is referred to Sri Lanka‘s Department of Commerce website. 
http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/indusrilanka_freetrade.php. 
34 A tariff rate quota is a quantity which can be imported at a certain duty. Any quantity above that 




Country 2  Table  List of Control Countries  Remarks 
China  Table A 
 
The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
China, India, Sri Lanka, minus Hong 
Kong China, Macao China, and ASEAN 
countries (Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam). 
165 Countries with no 
substantial change in 




United States  Table B 
 
The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
United States, India, Sri Lanka, minus 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Jordan, 
Mexico and Singapore.  
170 Countries with no 
substantial change in 
preferential trade relations 
with the United States 
European 
Union-15 
Table C  The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
EU-15, India, Sri Lanka, minus Algeria, 
Andorra,  Chile, Croatia,  Egypt,  Faroe 
Island,  Iceland, Israel,  Jordan, Lebanon,  
Mexico, Morocco, Norway, South 
Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Switzerland, Tunisia  and Turkey.   
144 Countries with no 
substantial change in 
preferential trade relations 
with the EU-15 
Indonesia   Table A 
 
The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
China, India, Sri Lanka, minus Hong 
Kong China, Macao China, and ASEAN 
countries (Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam). 
165 Countries with no 
substantial change in 




Australia  Table D  The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
Australia, India, Sri Lanka, minus New 
Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and United 
States. 
173 Countries with no 
substantial change in 
preferential trade relations 
with Australia 
Switzerland  Table E  The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
Switzerland, India, Sri Lanka, minus EU-
15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) , 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway (EFTA 
countries) and Faroe Islands. 
159 Countries with no 
substantial change in 
preferential trade relations  
with Switzerland 
 
Malaysia  Table A 
 
The 180 COMTRADE countries minus 
China, India, Sri Lanka, minus Hong 
Kong China, Macao China, and ASEAN 
countries (Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam). 
165 Countries with no 
substantial change in 





Note: The above table gives the list of control countries in brief. For transparency, the complete list can 
be obtained on request by sending an email to me at vivek.joshi@graduateinstitute.ch . 
 